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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we estimate the benefits to countries that purchase goods from China of having
access to intermediary services provided by Hong Kong. Traders in Hong Kong supply information on
markets and producers in China, which provides welfare gains to foreign firms using these services.
During the 1990s, Hong Kong intermediated about half of the goods that China exported to the rest of
the world. Our results suggests that gains to intermediary services provided by Hong Kong equal 16%
of the value of goods that China exports to other countries through Hong Kong, and range between 10%
and 21% of this export value for various manufacturing goods and across different years.
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Among the fastest growing countries of the world, China’s entry into global markets
during the past two decades has already brought large changes to the pattern of world trade.
These changes will no doubt be accelerated by its pending entry into the World Trade
Organization. But China’s large and growing trade volumes have not been achieved through
liberalization and growth alone. To a substantial extent, its trade has been intermediated by the
entrepôt economy of Hong Kong. Over the period 1988-1998, an average of 53% of Chinese
exports were re-exported through Hong Kong.
1 Recent theoretical literature emphasizes the
importance of intermediaries in reducing informational barriers to international trade (Casella
and Rauch, 2003, Rauch and Casella, 2003, Rauch and Trindade, 2000, Rauch and Watson,
2002, Wan and Weisman, 1999). This is confirmed by empirical studies, such as Gould (1994),
Head and Ries (1998), and Rauch and Trindade (2002), who find that bilateral trade volumes are
higher between countries that share large immigration flows and/or ethnic populations.
Presumably, these networks serve as conduits of information about trading opportunities.
Hong Kong traders engage in a range of activities that benefit their clients. Large trading
houses such as Li and Fung identify firms on the mainland that can engage in “outward
processing,” whereby inputs are imported into China duty-free and processed there, with the
final outputs re-exported through Hong Kong (Sung, 1991).
2 The markups on Hong Kong re-
exports of Chinese goods averaged 24% over 1988-96 (Hanson and Feenstra, 2000). For Hong
1 Re-exporting means that the goods did not receive “substantial transformation” en-route, but did benefit from
sorting, packaging, or the application of service activities such as marketing or transport. Goods that are simply
shipped through Hong Kong, without being removed from their carriers, are not counted among re-exports.
2 In addition, firms in Hong Kong broker inflows of foreign direct investment and international loans to China, and
advise foreign firms doing business in China (Sung, 1991). Naughton (1999) suggests Hong Kong firms engage in
“property rights arbitrage”: they use their specific knowledge of business conditions in China and the security of
property rights in Hong Kong to broker deals with agents who want access to China's market but are wary about its
insecure property rights.2
Kong overall, Young (1999) and Enright et al (1997) estimate that trading services accounted for
about 20% of Hong Kong GDP in 1994, whereas manufacturing accounted for only 7% of GDP
in that year. The large value of these trading services suggest that substantial gains accrue to the
mainland provinces engaged in processing, as well as the partner countries overseas. For
mainland China, Lin (2002) estimates the impact of processing trade on provincial wages. She
uses the methodology of Redding and Venables (2000), which involves estimating a gravity
equation in the first stage and then using the coefficients from this in a second-stage regression
that has wages as the dependent variable. Lin finds that about one-quarter of the wage disparity
between coastal provinces can be explained by their access to international markets.
Our goal in this paper is to estimate the benefits to countries that purchase goods from
China of having access to intermediary services provided by Hong Kong. Traders in Hong
Kong supply information on markets and producers in China, which provides welfare gains to
foreign firms using these services. We think of a foreign firm that is considering purchasing an
input from China as making a discrete choice over whether to purchase from China directly or
via Hong Kong. Data on “outward processing” trade from China is used to measure inputs
purchased by foreign firms.
3 Thinking of the decision problem as a discrete choice over
organizational forms – whether to outsource to China directly or through intermediaries in Hong
Kong – is consistent with recent theoretical work on trade and organizations, such as Rauch and
Trindade (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2002a,b).
4
3 Until the early 1990s, China had two regimes for exporters (Naughton, 1996). Those doing outward processing for
foreign buyers could import inputs duty free and export abroad directly. Other exporters faced barriers on imported
inputs and had to export through state-controlled foreign trade corporations. In 1992, the government began to lift
these restrictions, but the customs data from China still maintains the distinction between “processing trade” (which
is duty free) and “ordinary trade” (which is subject to duties). We only use data on the former, a substantial portion
of which is handled by intermediaries in Hong Kong.
4 Empirical literature on transactions costs also uses a discrete-choice framework to examine make-or-buy decisions.
See Baker and Hubbard (2001) and Whinston (2000) for discussion and references.3
In section 2 we describe the discrete choice model, and in section 3 we specify our
estimating equations. While we do not observe the actions of individual firms in deciding how
to purchase from China, we do observe the country-level flows that are re-exported through
Hong Kong. The discrete choice made by each foreign firm purchasing goods from China is
aggregated over all such firms in a given country, so that we obtain constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) demand functions for exports from China versus Hong Kong, by each
province. Thus, we will be using these aggregate trade data to infer the benefits of the discrete
choices made by firms. This approach to estimating a discrete choice model is analogous to that
used by Berry (1994) for models of product differentiation, except that our functional form
(nested CES) will differ from those more used typically (nested or mixed logit).
Our estimating method consists of two stages, described in section 4. First, we estimate
gravity equations for Chinese provincial exports to various destination countries. This is done
for processed goods that are either exported by China directly or re-exported by Hong Kong.
These gravity equations include indicator variables for each source province and destination
country pair, which measure the aggregate prices of direct Chinese exports and Hong Kong re-
exports. In the second stage, we regress each country’s purchases of Chinese goods from Hong
Kong relative to China on the coefficient of the indicator variables obtained from the gravity
equations, which give estimates of price elasticities. We expect that these elasticities should be
greater than unity, and we find support for this prediction. In section 5 we use these elasticities
to impute the welfare gains from foreign firms being able to purchase Chinese goods through
Hong Kong. These gains are about 16% of the Hong Kong re-export value in the aggregate, and
range between 10% and 21% of the re-export value for various manufacturing goods (and across
different years). In section 6 we conclude.4
2. Discrete Choice Model
In our application, we are interested in the decision by a firm to process a good in China.
This activity involves producing an intermediate input in a foreign country (e.g., the parts of a
shoe) and sending the input to China to be processed into a final good (e.g., assembled into a
finished shoe). We present a model of the firm’s input sourcing decision and then use this
framework to derive aggregate Chinese exports of processed goods, either direct from China or
through traders in Hong Kong, to firms in foreign countries. In the next section, we use these
results to specify estimating equations for Chinese exports.
We examine the decision of a firm from country m to use China as a partner to acquire a
good. We recognize that there are a range of possible suppliers in China, which differ according
to their quality and complementarity with the purchasing firm. Previous work (McLaren, 2000;
Rauch and Trindade, 2000; Grossman and Helpman, 2002a,b) models this sort of decision using
an “idea varieties” approach in which there is product differentiation around a unit-circle. We
instead exploit two other equivalent approaches to modeling product differentiation: (i)
obtaining “random utility” from various product varieties, and (ii) using a representative agent
who purchases all varieties.
5 We start with the first approach as applied to a purchasing firm,
where the random errors measure transaction costs that differ across suppliers. We then show
how to aggregate over input sourcing decisions by individual firms in a given country, to obtain
a representative firm that chooses over two organizational modes: whether to purchase inputs
from China directly or use an intermediary in Hong Kong.
The decision tree for a firm in country m is shown in Figure 1. Firms can either have an
input processed in China or have it processed elsewhere. This decision occurs at the first level,
5 The equivalence between the ideal-variety and representative consumer approach in international trade models
was described most fully by Helpman and Krugman (1985). The equivalence between all three approaches in the
consumer context was demonstrated by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992).5
where h = 1 refers to sending inputs to China for further processing, and h = 2 refers to sending
inputs elsewhere to be processed. This first choice is implicit in our analysis and not one we
examine empirically. We reference this choice here to acknowledge that there are previous
decision stages that we do not analyze. At the next level, the firm must decide whether to use
intermediaries in Hong Kong (i=1), or purchase inputs from China directly (i=2). At the final
level, the firms (or its intermediaries in Hong Kong) must decide from which province im J j∈ in
China to purchase the good. The set of supplying provinces Jim depends on whether or not Hong
Kong is used as an intermediary and on the destination country m. As illustrated in Figure 1, this
problem involves three levels of nesting. Since we focus on the second and third levels, we
suppress subscript h in what follows.
Suppose that firms in country m commit to spend the amount Cm to produce an input,
including material purchases and any additional labor needed. We will suppose that these costs
are given by a Cobb-Douglas function of the prices pijm paid in Chinese province j, and the
prices of other inputs qim paid in the home country:
Cm = ) q p ( y i i 1
im ijm m
α − α , im J j∈ ,( 1 )
where ym is the production of the finished input. For the outward-processing trade, qim denotes
the cost of the raw materials sent from home and pijm denotes production wages in Chinese
province im J j∈ . The firm may choose to use Hong Kong as an intermediary (i=1) or buy
directly from China (i=2). Note that the cost share of the inputs purchased in China, α i, depends
on whether Hong Kong is used as an intermediary or not.6
The output ym shown in (1) is the expected value of production, which differs from the
actual quantity of production yijm due to a random error:
ln yijm =l ny m + ε ijm,( 2 )
where ε ijm reflects transaction costs arising from outsourcing to a Chinese or Hong Kong partner.
The term ε ijm in (3) is a random component of production that is observable ex ante to firms.
That is, each firm in country m receives a different draw from the distribution for ε m,a n dm a k e s
its optimizing decisions based on this draw. Let us normalize the price of home labor or
materials at unity, qim≡ 1. Then solving for expected production ym from (1), and substituting
this into (2) gives:
ln yijm = ijm i m p ln C ln α − + ijm ε , im J j∈ .( 3 )
In (3), there are two potential advantages to purchasing inputs through Hong Kong rather
than from China directly. First, the quality of production for inputs purchased through Hong
Kong may be higher, implying a lower effective cost of production, p1jm. This might occur if
Hong Kong traders have better information about the quality of producers in China than do
foreign firms. Second, transaction costs could differ for purchases through Hong Kong. If
foreign firms have limited experience in dealing directly with Chinese suppliers or with
importing and exporting goods in the country, they might perceive these transaction costs as high
relative to those from purchasing through Hong Kong, so that the Hong Kong price p1jmis again
low.7
The firm will choose the mode of purchase i=1,2 and supplier province j∈ Jim to
maximize its production given costs of Cm. The probability that each firm will choose mode i
and province j is:
] j' j, , i' i, all for ), p ln p (ln Prob[
] j' j, , i' i, all for , p ln p ln Prob[
] J j' , J j 1,2; i' i, all for , y ln y ln Prob[ Prob
m ' j ' i ijm i m ' j ' i ijm
m ' j ' i m ' j ' i i ijm ijm i
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(4)
We can think of (4) as the probability that a firm in country m chooses alternative (i,j), or
equivalently, as the expected fraction of the firms in country m choosing that alternative. If
alternative (i,j) is chosen, then the quantity purchased from province j is determined from the














It follows that expected exports from a representative firm in province j to country m are:
6
Xijm =x ijmProbijm .( 6 )
In general, computing the choice probabilities from (4) can be difficult since it requires
integration over various subsets of the domain of the random terms ε m. However, McFadden
(1978, 1981) shows that as long as ε m has a generalized extreme value distribution, the discrete
choice problem for the agents can be aggregated to obtain market-level demand quite easily. The
most common application of McFadden’s theorem is to a consumer setting in which the good in
6 We normalize the population of firms in each province at unity, so that (6) is also total exports from province j to
country m, using mode of outsourcing i.8
question is purchased in quantity 0 or 1. In that case, if the random errors in utility are
distributed as iid extreme value, then the solution for demand is the familiar logit formulation. If
instead the random errors in utility were distributed as extreme value but correlated within some
groups, then the solution for demand is the nested logit form.
Our formulation of the firm’s problem in (3) and (4) of maximizing production given
costs is analogous to the consumer problem of maximizing utility given income. It is more
general than the typical discrete choice problem in that we are also allowing the firm to make a
continuous choice of the inputs purchased in China (and at home). This falls into the category of
so-called “continuous/discrete” models (see Train, 1986). Our formulation of the problem is
simplified, however, because there is no uncertainty over the quantity of purchases in (5): the
random term in production affects only the choice of supplier in (4).
7 It turns out that in this
setting, the aggregation results of McFadden (1978, 1981) still apply, as we now describe.
Suppose that the random term in (3) is distributed as extreme value but correlated within
and across the modes of outsourcing. The distribution function for these errors is,





























− ∑∑ ,( 7 )
where ρ i measures the correlation between random terms ε ijm within each mode of outsourcing
i=1,2, while ρ 0 measures the correlation of errors across modes.
8 An implication of the discrete
7 In contrast, Dubin and McFadden (1984) consider an application where there is uncertainty in both the discrete
choice of the product and the continuous amount to consume.
8 This distribution function is used by McFadden (1981). Johnson and Kotz (1972) report that with ρ 0=0, the
parameters (1-ρ i )e q u a l ) ikm , ijm ( corr 1 ε ε − ,f o rj , k∈ Jim and j ≠ k.9
choice literature is that the correlation should satisfy 0 < ρ 0 < ρ i < 1, meaning that the errors are
more highly correlated across provinces within a mode of outsourcing than across outsourcing
modes. That is, the uncertainty in transaction costs that a U.S. firm faces when securing a
supplier in Yunan versus Shangxi province is more highly correlated than that between the U.S.
firm and a Hong Kong intermediary when securing a supplier in the same province.
With the error structure in (7), let Ym ≡ exp[E(ln ym)] denote the expected value of
production for a firm in country m that has spent Cm on outsourcing. Then it can be shown that
expected production (up to a constant) takes on the nested CES form:
9
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This formulation can be thought of as an “indirect production function” of the firm, giving
expected production Ym conditional on costs Cm and input prices. Inverting (8), we obtain the





























= ∑∑ .( 9 )
We are now in a position to derive exports by suppliers in Chinese provinces to foreign
countries, which will form the basis for the estimating equations. Applying Shepard’s Lemma to
(9), we can compute expected exports from province j to country m, denoted by Xijm as in (6):
9 A principal result of Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1989, 1992) is that the CES indirect utility function is
obtained from a discrete choice model using Cobb-Douglas utility with extreme value errors. This is also shown in
Feenstra (2003, Appendix B), though the functions in (7) and (8) are somewhat more general than considered there.10
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where the term ∑ ∈





ijm im p I appearing in (10) is an “inclusive value”. This term is
closely related to the price index for Hong Kong re-exports (i=1) or direct Chinese exports (i=2),
which we define as:
[] i i i i
im
i i / ) 1 (
im
/ ) 1 (
J j
) 1 /(
ijm im I p P
α ρ − − α ρ − −
∈
ρ − α − = ≡ ∑ , i=1,2. (11)
Comparing (10) with (5) and (6), we see that the final two ratios on the right of (10) equal
Probijm, the probability that province j and mode i are chosen by a firm in country m.
10 These
two ratios would also appear in a nested logit system, so that the new feature of exports in (10) is
the term (α iCm/pijm), which reflects the continuous quantity choice of inputs.
We can use demand in (10) to solve for the elasticity of substitution between products.
For two supplying provinces im J k , j ∈ , we obtain the relative demand from country m,
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Thus, the elasticity of substitution between two provincial suppliers, using either Hong Kong as
an intermediary (i=1) or purchasing directly from China (i=2), is 1+[α i/(1–ρ i )] > 1.
10 The ratio ] [ im
) i 1 /( i
ijm I / p
ρ − α − is the probability that province j is chosen given that outsourcing mode i is used, and
the ratio ∑ =
ρ − ρ − ρ − ρ − 2
1 h
) 0 1 /( ) i 1 (
hm
) 0 1 /( ) i 1 (
im ] [ I / I is the probability that the mode of outsourcing i=1,2 is chosen.11
In addition, we can use (10) to compute the ratio of country m expenditure on all
products from Hong Kong versus all products imported directly from China. Define the total
value of exports to country m in each mode as,
ijm
J j




= , i=1,2. (12)
Then from (10) we have that Hong Kong relative to China exports to country m are:
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This can be re-written in real terms using the price indexes from (11):
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= . (13)
The left-side of (13) is ratio of purchases from Hong Kong versus purchases from China
directly, deflated by their price indexes, and so can be interpreted as a ratio of real exports. We
see that this depends on the ratio of price indexes for the two modes of outsourcing, and the
elasticities with respect to each price index are 1+[α i/(1–ρ 0 ) ]>1 . W i t h0<ρ 0 < ρ i <1 ,t h e s e
higher-level elasticities are less than or equal to the lower-level elasticities of substitution,
1+[α i/(1–ρ 0 )] < 1+[α i/(1–ρ i )].
In (10) we have an expression for exports of processed goods from a Chinese province,
under either mode of outsourcing (direct from China or through Hong Kong), to purchasing
country m, and in (13) we have an expression for total exports to purchasing country m by the12
direct China outsourcing mode relative to total exports to country m by the Hong Kong
outsourcing mode. These two equations are the basis for our empirical work.
3. Estimating Equations
Equations (10) and (13) contain variables that are difficult to measure empirically. With
some modification, we can convert these expressions into a specification that we can estimate
with available data. Rather than use the quantity of exports from (10) in our empirical work, we
convert it to a value Eijm =p ijmXijm, which is exports from province j to country m using the
mode of outsourcing i=1,2. The total value of exports to country m in each mode is as in (12).
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We will let the c.i.f. prices pijm from province j in China differ according to destination
country m, due to transportation costs. These are modeled as a simple function of distance:
β + = ) d 1 ( p p ijm ij ijm , (16)
where dijm is the distance from province j to country m, and pij is the f.o.b. price in province j net
of any transport costs. Substituting these prices into (14) and (15), we can write exports as:13



















































Equation (17) gives exports from province j to country m relative to total Chinese exports
to country m, either via Hong Kong (i=1) or directly (i=2). These relative exports depend on the
f.o.b. price in province j, ln pij, which we do not observe. But in a dataset with observations on
provincial exports to many purchasing countries, we can estimate this first variable on the right
of (17) as the coefficient on indicator variable for province j, ij i i ij p ln )] 1 /( [ − ρ α − ≡ δ , depending
on the mode of outsourcing. The second variable on the right of (17) is the inclusive value for
exports of mode i to country m. Again, with data on exports to purchasing countries from many
provinces we can estimate this as the coefficient on a indicator variable for purchasing country
m, im im I ln − ≡ δ , depending on the mode of outsourcing. Then we re-write (17) to obtain our
first regression equation:
ijm ijm i im ij im ijm ) d 1 ln( ) E / E ln( µ + + γ + δ + δ = , im J j∈ , m=1,…,M, (19)
where )] 1 /( [ i i ij − ρ β α − ≡ γ . The error term in (19) reflects the fact that the c.i.f. price may differ
randomly from the f.o.b. price due to unobserved trade costs.
The second regression equation is (18), which includes as data a constant term and the
indicator variables im im I ln − ≡ δ , i=1,2. Of course, the estimated value of these from the first







































where the signs of the coefficients on the right have changed from (18) due to the substitution
im im I ln − ≡ δ ,i = 1 , 2 .
11
In the first stage of estimation, we shall estimate (19) while pooling over Chinese
provinces j=1,…,Jim and destination countries m=1,…,M. Separate regressions are estimated
depending on whether the Chinese exports go through Hong Kong or not (i=1,2), and also for
each year of data. The estimates of im im I ln − ≡ δ , i=1,2, are obtained as the coefficients of
indicator variables for each source-province and destination-country pair in (19), leaving
distance as the remaining independent variable. In the second stage, these inclusive values are
used in (20) to estimate the relative expenditure on exports from Hong Kong versus directly from
China, using the data m=1,…,M over destination countries. We will also pool data over multiple
years to estimate (20), on the assumption that the parameters ρ i and ρ 0 are constant over time.
We can compare (19) with a conventional estimation of the gravity equation, under which
exports are regressed on country GDPs and the distance between them. Anderson and Van
Wincoop (2001) have correctly criticized this conventional approach since it fails to take account
of the price indexes that should appear in the equation. They show how to solve implicitly for
the price index using observed trade data, and build this into their estimation. The inclusive
values that we have used are very similar to their price indexes: in logs the price indexes in (11)
are im i i im i i im ] / ) 1 [( I ln ] / ) 1 [( P ln δ α ρ − = α ρ − − = , so the indicator variables δ im are directly
proportional to the prices indexes.
11 Since the regressors in (20) are estimated, we use bootstrapped standard errors to compute the t-statistics.15
By including the indicator variables δ im in equations (19) and (20),we are effectively
including the price indexes, consistent with the critique of Anderson and van Wincoop (2001).
This approach is similar to Redding and Venables (2000), who show how a correct estimation of
the gravity equation can be obtained by using indicator variables for source and destination
countries; in comparison, we are including indicator variables for each source province and each
destination country. After estimating these indicator variables in a first stage, Redding and
Venables proceed by specifying a second-stage regression that uses these indicator variables to
estimate wages in exporting countries. In this formulation, trade benefits exporters by raising
wages. In contrast, we shall use the estimates from (20) to impute benefits to importers from
having Hong Kong available as an intermediary in outsourcing to China. The details of this
welfare calculation will be discussed after presenting estimates of (19) and (20).
4. Data and Estimation
Data on direct trade between Chinese provinces and destination countries is obtained
from the Customs General Administration of the People’s Republic of China, which provides the
value and quantity of exports and imports under the ordinary and processing trade regime by
province and year for 1988 to 1998. To compile indirect exports of Chinese goods that are sent
to Hong Kong and then re-exported, we use Hong Kong imports, exports, and re-exports from
the Hong Kong Census and Statistical Office for 1988 to 1998.
We measure distance between Chinese provinces and the rest of the world in two
different ways: arc distance,
12 which is the minimum-length arc that connects each Chinese
province to a destination country, and “internal-external” distance, which assumes that goods
12 We obtain each location’s latitude and longitude from http://www.mapblast.com/myblast/index.mb ,
and http://www.nau.edu/~cvm/latlongdist.html provides the distance calculation.16
from an interior province must pass through a transportation hub in a coastal province (internal
distance), and then be delivered to the rest of the world (external distance). Internal distance is
in terms of rail distance, obtained from Chinese railroad timetables. External distance is the arc
distance between a Chinese port and the destination country.
Table 1 shows total China exports, China outward processing exports, and Hong Kong
re-exports of Chinese goods for 1988-1998. Total China exports (direct trade plus re-exports)
have risen dramatically over time. Outward processing and shipments through Hong Kong are a
substantial part of this total. The outward processing share of China’s total exports in column (6)
increases from 32% in 1988 to 55% by 1998. The re-export share of China’s total exports in
column (2) increases from 43% in 1988 to 61% in 1993 and then declines to 45% by 1998. The
decline in the later period may be due in part to increases in exports by Chinese regions distant
from Hong Kong (Sung, 1997). The re-export share of Chinese outward processing exports
shown in column (3) also rises and then falls, from 67% in 1988 to 83% in 1993 and then down
to 61% by 1998. Columns (4)-(6) show that the outward processing share of direct Chinese
exports is smaller than for Hong Kong re-exports, though both have been rising over time.
Table 2 shows the distribution of total Chinese exports and Hong Kong re-exports of
Chinese goods across one-digit SITC (Standard Industrial Trade Classification) industries.
About 43% of total exports are in miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 8), whose major
sub-sectors are apparel, footwear and toys. Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) and
manufactured goods classified by material (SITC 6), which include leather, metal, paper, rubber,
textile and wood products, are two additional important sources of exports, each accounting for
17% of shipments. SITC 7 and 8 are the two industries in which re-exports account for the17
largest fraction of total exports, with re-export shares of 70%. These are also the two industries
in which outward-processed goods dominate China's shipments to Hong Kong.
Table 3 shows the distribution of direct exports and Hong Kong re-exports across regions
and the average share of re-exports in total exports by region. For both direct exports and re-
exports, the major destinations are the relatively large markets of North America, Western
Europe, and East Asia. The regions for which re-exports account for most trade include the
relatively rich and distant regions of North America (71%) and Western Europe (62%), the
relatively rich and near region of Oceania (61%), and the relatively poor and distant regions of
Latin America (65%) and Africa (50%). Evidently, the benefits of using Hong Kong as an
intermediary are less important for other nearby countries in Asia, and Eastern Europe.
4.1 Gravity Equation
In the first stage regression, we estimate the gravity equation in (19). We show results
for both measures of distance. Table 4 reports OLS coefficient estimates for 1995. Estimates for
other years are very similar. The dependent variable is direct Chinese exports or indirect Hong
Kong re-exports from Chinese provinces to destination countries. All exports are of goods
related to outward processing. The independent variables are the log of arc distance or the log of
internal distance plus the log of external distance, as well as indicator variables for the
destination country and the Chinese province. For direct exports from China, coefficients on arc
distance and internal-external distance are negative and precisely estimated. For Hong Kong re-
exports, coefficients on internal-external distance are negative and precisely estimated, but the
coefficient on arc distance has a positive sign. We constructed arc distance for Hong Kong re-
exports as the sum of the arc distance between the Chinese province and Hong Kong and the arc
distance between Hong Kong and rest of the world. We suspect that the arc distance between the18
Chinese province and Hong Kong may be a poor indicator of true transportation cost because of
uneven rail, road, and water links within the country. Internal-external distance is likely to be a
better measure of this type of transportation costs.
To see whether coefficient estimates vary across industries, Table 5 presents regression
results on the gravity equation in 1995 for one-digit SITC industries. We first show results for
direct Chinese trade and then for Hong Kong re-exports. In both cases, the distance measure is
the internal-external variable. There are more observations for Hong Kong re-exports than for
direct China trade, which suggests that Chinese provinces are able to trade with a larger number
of countries when firms use traders in Hong Kong as intermediaries. For direct China trade, in
most industries internal and external distance are negatively correlated with exports. A few
industries, such as beverages and tobacco, have anomalous results.
For Hong Kong re-exports, in most industries internal distance is negative and precisely
estimated but external distance is estimated quite imprecisely. It appears that Hong Kong re-
exports of Chinese goods are only weakly correlated with distance to the destination country.
One explanation of this result is that since external distance is the arc distance from Hong Kong
to the destination country it may be a noisy measure of transportation cost. A second
explanation is that internal distance, the distance from a Chinese port to the exporting province,
is the primary concern of purchases in importing countries. Given large costs of transporting
goods from China’s interior to the coast, firms in destination countries prefer to purchase goods
from provinces that have a geographic advantage in delivering the goods to Hong Kong.
4.2 Hong Kong Re-exports versus Direct Chinese Exports
In the second-stage regression, equation (20), we use the estimated coefficients on the
destination-country indicator variables, im ˆ δ , i=1,2, obtained from estimation of the first-stage19
gravity equation (using the internal-external distance variable). These coefficients are
proportional to the price indexes for either direct purchases from China or indirect purchases
through Hong Kong. The dependent variable in (20) is the ratio of Hong Kong re-exports to
direct China exports to a given destination country. An increase in the Hong Kong inclusive
value (price index) should lower the relative Hong Kong share, while an increase in the direct
China inclusive value (price indexes) should raise the relative Hong Kong share.
13 Therefore,
the Hong Kong inclusive value (price index) should enter with a negative sign in (20), and the
direct China inclusive value should enter with a positive sign. We run this regression with data
pooled over 11 years, all destination countries, and all industries.
Table 6 presents the estimation results for the second-stage regression. The implication
of the discrete choice literature that 0 < ρ 0 < ρ i < 1 means that the estimated coefficients on
inclusive values (price indexes) should both be less than unity in absolute value. The results are
consistent with this restriction under either specification of distance. In addition the signs of the
estimated coefficients are all as expected and are all precisely estimated.
Table 7 reports the second-stage estimation results at the one-digit SITC level. The first
column of Table 7 indicates that for most industries the Hong Kong inclusive values have the
expected negative sign and are precisely estimated. The exceptions are manufacturing goods
classified by material, which has the wrong sign, and miscellaneous manufacturing articles,
which is imprecisely estimated.
14 In the second column, the inclusive values for direct Chinese
trade have the expected positive sign and are precisely estimated for five industries and are
imprecisely estimated for three industries.
13 Recall from (13) that the elasticities of the relative expenditures with respect to each price index is greater than
one in absolute value.
14 When the second-stage regression for manufacturing goods classified by material is run using the inclusive
values obtained from the first-stage using arc distance, the second-stage results are stronger, as indicated in the notes
to Table 7. Those results are used for the calculations in Table 9.20
5. Welfare Benefits from China’s Trade with Hong Kong
We turn now to the question posed at the outset of the paper: what is the welfare gain to
a country from being able to purchase Chinese goods through Hong Kong rather than from China
directly? Going through Hong Kong gives purchasers access to intermediary services they might
not have, otherwise. We utilize the indirect production function in (8) for the representative firm
in country m. Using the indicator variables ∑ ∈
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The benefits to a purchasing country from having Hong Kong available can be computed
as the log of the ratio of expected production with and without this intermediary, or,
() []
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where the second line is obtained by making use of Hong Kong re-exports and China exports,
E1m and E2m, as in (15). This welfare expression can be re-written as,
] E ) E E ( ln[ ) 1 ( m 2 m 2 m 1 0 + ρ − = )] E E ( E ln[ ) 1 ( m 2 m 1 m 2 0 + − ρ
= {} )] E E ( E [ 1 ln ) 1 ( m 2 m 1 m 1 0 + − − ρ > )] E E ( E [ ) 1 ( m 2 m 1 m 1 0 + ρ − , (22)
where the final inequality follows from the concavity of the natural log function.
From (22), a lower-bound to the welfare gain is the share of Hong Kong re-exports in
total Chinese trade times the coefficient (1-ρ 0), which is inversely related to the upper-level21
elasticity 1+[α i/(1-ρ 0)]. The result that the welfare gain from a “new product” equals its share of
expenditure times a term inversely related to the elasticity is obtained for CES functions by
Feenstra (1994). The expression in (22) is completely analogous to this CES result, where the
“new product” is the Hong Kong intermediaries. The more valuable is the information provided
by these traders, the higher will be expenditure on Hong Kong re-exports, and the greater is the
welfare gain in (22); conversely, the higher is the elasticity, the lower is the welfare gain.
15
To compute this gain, however, we need to have an estimate of ρ 0. Our second-stage
estimation in (20) provides us with estimates of the ratios (1-ρ 1)/(1-ρ 0)a n d( 1 - ρ 2)/(1-ρ 0). In
order to obtain ρ 0, therefore, we need some independent estimates of ρ 1 or ρ 2. To obtain this, we
note that from (10) the coefficient 1+α 1/(1-ρ 1) equals the own-price elasticity of demand for a re-
export from any province through Hong Kong. Consider a trader in Hong Kong who buys some
good k in China and then re-exports it. The trader will choose price p1k (where i=1 indicates
Hong Kong re-exports k denotes the good) to maximize profits. From the first-order conditions
to the trader’s profit-maximization problem, we can express the markup of price over marginal
cost as inversely related to the price elasticity of demand:
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where p1k is the f.o.b. price for good k in Hong Kong, and c1k is the marginal cost to the trader of
obtaining good k from China.
15 We prefer using the lower-bound on the right of (22) to the expression in (21), because it can be argued that (22)
is robust to having alternative options for outsourcing beyond just Hong Kong and China directly. Recall from
Figure 1 that a firm in country m first has the choice over whether to purchase from China (directly or via Hong
Kong) or from another country. Even if we take these alternative countries into account, the welfare gain from using
Hong Kong is still bounded from below by the share of Hong Kong in total expenditure on outsourcing.22
We calculate the markup on the left of (23) based on the price at which Hong Kong
imports disaggregate goods from China, and the price at which it re-exports them, as described in
Feenstra, et al (1998, 1999). Denoting these markups by π 1k, we obtain the simple equation,
k 1
1 1
k 1 )] 1 /( [ 1
1
ε +
ρ − α +
= π , (24)
where the error term reflects inaccuracies in measuring the markups across goods. Therefore, an
estimate of the elasticity of demand for products re-exported through Hong Kong is:
)] ˆ 1 /( ˆ [ 1
1
1 1
1 ρ − α +
= π , (25)
where we take the mean of the markups over all products. The mean Hong Kong markups for
each of the years in our sample is shown in column (1) of Table 8. With these, we calculate the
elasticity of demand as 1 1 1 / 1 ) ˆ 1 /( ˆ 1 π = ρ − α + .
Next, we obtain an estimate of the cost-share α 1 by using Chinese trade data on
processing trade. Specifically, we compute α 1 as the difference between Chinese processing
exports and processing imports from Hong Kong, divided by the value of processing exports.
This calculation reflects the value-added of processing goods in China, relative to their final
export value, and the results are shown in column (2) of Table 8.
16 The value-added in China
was about 12% of exports in 1989, rising to one-third of export value in 1998. Using these
estimates, the implied value of ) ˆ 1 ( 1 ρ − in column (3) is obtained as ] 1 ) / 1 /[( ˆ 1 1 − π α .
16 We make this calculation for processing goods imported to China from Hong Kong, and then exported back to
Hong Kong. A much smaller value of processing goods enter China from other countries, which would provide us
with an estimate of α 2 rather than α 1.W e f i n d t h a t α 2 is more than twice as high as α 1 in early years, but similar in
recent years.23
Finally, we divide ) ˆ 1 ( 1 ρ − by the absolute coefficient on the Hong Kong indicator
variable in regression (20), which was 0.28 in Table 6, to obtain an estimate of ) ˆ 1 ( 0 ρ − .T h e s e
values are shown in column (4) of Table 8, and fluctuate between 0.1 and 0.4. Multiplying these
by the Hong Kong share of total processing exports from China, in column (5), we obtain the
welfare gains shown in column (6). These gains are between 9% and 24% of expenditure on
processing exports, averaging 16% over the sample years. The variation around this average
reflects annual fluctuations in the markups charged on Hong Kong re-exports, as well as the
value-added in China on processing goods.
In Table 9, we perform the same calculation using the one-digit SITC industries. In
several industries, such as food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, and mineral fuels, re-
exports through Hong Kong are so low that there is little gain to this activity. But for many
manufactured goods (SITC 6 and 7), we obtain sizable estimates of the welfare gain: 10% for
the large category of manufactured goods classified by material, and 21% for machinery and
transportation equipment.
17 Unfortunately, in the category of miscellaneous manufactured
articles (SITC 8) we did not obtain a coefficient on the Hong Kong inclusive value of the correct
sign, so we cannot make the welfare calculation in this industry. Across all industries, we utilize
the aggregate second-stage regression coefficients in Table 6, and again find a welfare gain of
16%, as obtained when we averaged the annual data.
17 In manufactured goods classified by material, we use the absolute coefficient on the Hong Kong indicator
variable of 0.23, reported in the notes to Table 7. This is obtained using arc distance in the gravity equation. In
addition, we use the aggregate cost share α 1= 0.23, which is the average over 1988 - 1998 from Table 8. This cost
share cannot be calculated at the industry level from our data.24
6. Conclusions
Recent theoretical work in international trade emphasizes the importance of traders:
agents who are able to match clients across different countries. Among the largest traders in the
world economy are those located in Hong Kong, who intermediate a huge volume of trade for
China and other Asian countries. This intermediation surely brings significant gains to their
clients, and in this paper we estimate the welfare gains to countries that use Hong Kong to
outsource to China. Such outsourcing can be measured by outward processing trade in China.
Our theoretical model allows us to impute price indexes (or “inclusive values”) for Hong
Kong re-exports versus direct Chinese exports to various destination countries. The demand for
each of these two modes of outsourcing is elastic (due to the presence of the other alternative), so
an increase in either price should reduce the share of expenditure on those exports. We obtain
price elasticities of the anticipated sign for Hong Kong re-exports of processing goods. Using
these, the gains are calculated at 16% of the Hong Kong re-export value of processing goods, and
range between 10% and 21% of the re-export value for specific manufacturing goods. For
example, China’s total exports of processing goods (either directly or via Hong Kong) was
nearly US$ 100 billion in 1998. Applying the welfare estimate of 16%, this yields gains of US$
16 billion to the purchasing countries. About one-third of these gains would accrue to firms in
North America, and another one-quarter to firms in Western Europe. These represent efficiency
gains to the firms involved in outsourcing, due to savings in transaction costs that would arise
from dealing directly with firms in China. The efficiency gain of 16% is sizable by any standard,
and would be passed onto consumers worldwide in lower prices for goods outsourced through
Hong Kong.25
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Table 1: Direct Exports and Re-exports of Chinese Goods (Percent)
Total Re-Export Re-Export Outward Processing Share of China:
China Exports Share of Total Share of China Direct Re-exports to Total
Year: (billions US$) China Exports Processing
Exports
Exports Hong Kong Exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
88 38.7 43.1 66.7 12.8 49.7 32.1
89 46.3 51.5 72.7 19.7 56.9 40.3
90 55.4 55.2 74.4 21.9 58.5 43.4
91 67.8 59.1 77.2 24.9 61.5 47.1
92 84.7 60.1 79.2 24.8 63.1 47.9
93 98.0 61.3 83.4 24.4 67.2 49.4
94 120.2 57.7 75.1 27.4 62.1 47.7
95 151.6 53.3 70.0 32.7 65.8 50.1
96 161.0 49.8 69.7 38.1 76.0 54.3
97 181.3 46.9 62.2 39.6 69.9 52.7
98 177.7 45.4 61.3 40.7 73.8 54.7
Notes: Column (1) shows total China exports (direct exports plus re-exports through Hong
Kong) in billions of current U.S. dollars; column (2) shows Chinese re-exports through Hong
Kong as a share of total Chinese exports; column (3) shows Chinese re-exports through Hong
Kong of outward processing goods as a share of total Chinese outward processing exports;
columns (3)-(5) shows the share of exports related to outward processing in direct Chinese
exports to countries other than Hong Kong, Chinese re-exports to Hong Kong, and total Chinese
exports.29
Table 2: Direct Exports and Re-exports of Chinese Goods,
by One-digit SITC Industry (Percent)
Industry Re-Export Re-Export Outward Processing












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 Food and Live
Animals
6.5 14.2 19.8 8.9 16.0
1 Beverages and
Tobacco
0.4 35.1 51.3 6.7 17.0
2 Crude Materials 3.9 22.0 51.8 2.8 11.6
3 Mineral Fuels 4.8 0.6 3.3 3.9 15.8
4 Animal and
Vegetable Oils
0.1 17.1 0.0 15.1 72.5
5 Chemical Products 4.7 21.9 30.5 12.9 27.6
6 Manufactured Goods
Classified by Material
17.8 41.6 44.4 28.0 42.1
7 Machinery and
Transport Equip.
17.2 69.5 75.4 44.7 84.4
8 Misc. Manufactured
Articles
43.4 70.1 73.6 43.9 71.4
Notes: Column (1) shows each one-digit SITC industry's share of total Chinese exports ; column
(2) shows the share of re-exports in each industry’s total exports; column (3) shows re-exports
through Hong Kong of outward processing goods as a share of industry outward processing
exports; and columns (4)-(5) shows the share of exports related to outward processing in direct
industry exports to countries other than Hong Kong, and industry re-exports to Hong Kong. All
figures are averages over the 1988-1998 period30
Table 3: Direct Exports and Re-Exports of Chinese Goods by Region (Percent)
Region Region Re-Export
Region Share of Share of Share of
Direct Exports Re-Exports Total Exports
(1) (2) (3)
Africa 3.2 2.6 49.9
East Asia 36.8 18.0 35.6
Eastern Europe 4.2 0.9 24.8
Latin America 2.5 4.2 65.0
Middle East 4.0 2.6 42.8
North America 16.7 37.3 71.4
Oceania 1.7 2.4 61.2
South Asia 2.7 1.0 30.6
Southeast Asia 11.2 6.0 37.8
Western Europe 16.9 24.9 62.1
Notes: This table shows each region’s share of Chinese direct exports in column (1) and of total
re-exports of Chinese goods by Hong Kong in column (2). Column (3) shows the share of re-
exports in Chinese exports to each region. All figures are averages over the period 1988-1998.31
Table 4: Gravity Equation at Aggregate Level, 1995
Direct China Trade Hong Kong Re-exports
Using Arc Distance





Internal Distance -0.59 -3.44
(-9.91) (-87.87)




Notes: This table shows regressions results for the specification in equation (19). The
dependent variable is the log ratio of outward processing exports by Chinese province,
industry, and destination country to total outward processing exports by industry and
destination country (regressions are run separately for each year). The independent
variables are log distance, indicator variables for the destination country, and indicator
variables for the Chinese province. The regressions are run separately for two
outsourcing modes, direct exports from China and re-exports of Chinese goods through
Hong Kong. T-statistics are in parentheses.32
Table 5: Gravity Equation for SITC Industries, 1995











Food and -0.44 -1.59 338 0.65 -0.45 -0.04 1516 0.77
Live Animals (-1.82) (-3.25) (-7.04) (-0.17)
Beverages and -0.74 -0.1 83 0.73 0.90 -0.33 362 0.70
Tobacco (-2.57) (-0.13) (9.66) (-0.86)
Crude -0.07 -1.01 172 0.62 0.23 0.4 654 0.69
Materials (-0.27) (-1.62) (1.8) (1.22)
Mineral Fuels 0.64 -1.32 76 0.72 0.19 -0.07 220 0.97
(1.15) (-0.45) (9.19) (-0.74)
Animal and - - - - -0.09 1.02 80 0.89
Vegetable Oils
a (-0.38) (1.34)
Chemical -0.17 -1.37 624 0.62 -0.46 0.25 2507 0.76
Products (-1.49) (-3.63) (-13.01) (1.34)
Manufactured Goods -0.34 -0.95 1365 0.50 -0.58 0.11 3577 0.72
Classified by Material (-2.76) (-3.79) (-21.54) (0.8)
Machinery and -0.40 -0.86 1026 0.51 -0.65 0.06 3474 0.79
Transport Equip. (-3.79) (-2.21) (-28.75) (0.42)
Misc. Manufactured -0.51 -1.86 1296 0.64 -0.86 0.02 3962 0.91
Articles (-4.94) (-5.94) (-56.4) (0.18)
Notes:
a. There are insufficient observations on direct China trade for Animal and Vegetable Oils.
The regression results in this table reproduce the results in Table 4 separately for each one-digit
SITC industry. See notes to that table for further details. T-statistics are in parentheses.33
Table 6: Second-Stage Estimation at Aggregate Level
Hong Kong China
Indicator Indicator Obs. R
2
Using Arc Distance
-0.16 0.19 1582 0.04
(-5.38) (6.06)
Using Internal-External Distance
-0.28 0.17 1582 0.04
(-5.08) (5.46)
Notes: This table reports regression results for equation (20), using data over 1988-1998. The
dependent variable is the log ratio of direct China outward processing exports to Hong-Kong re-
exports of outward processed goods from China by industry and destination country (regressions
are run separately for each year). The independent variables are the coefficients on the indicator
variables for destination country from the regressions in column (1) and column (2) in Table 4.
Standard errors are corrected by using bootstrap techniques and t-statistics are in parentheses.34






Food and -0.41 0.44 689 0.13
Live Animals (-3.40) (8.80)
Beverages and -0.44 0.07 220 0.07
Tobacco (-3.63) (0.90)
Crude -0.27 0.29 385 0.15
Materials (-2.83) (6.68)
Mineral Fuels -0.16 0.22 129 0.15
(-0.43) (3.52)
Chemical -0.52 0.42 1080 0.22
Products (-7.80) (12.32)




Machinery and -0.19 -0.005 1255 0.07
Transport Equip. (-4.31) (-0.16)
Misc. Manufactured 0.05 0.30 1359 0.15
Articles (0.98) (11.99)
Notes:






Manufactured Goods -0.23 0.12 1337 0.08
Classified by Material (-8.61) (3.45)
The regression results in this table reproduce the results in Table 6 separately for each one-digit
SITC industry. Standard errors are corrected by using bootstrap techniques and t-statistics are in
parentheses. See notes to that table for further details.35
Table 8: Welfare Gain from Hong Kong Re-exports



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
88 0.24 na na na 66.7 na
89 0.26 12.2 0.043 0.152 72.7 11.0
90 0.25 18.3 0.062 0.222 74.4 16.5
91 0.27 16.3 0.060 0.216 77.2 16.6
92 0.23 14.7 0.045 0.159 79.2 12.6
93 0.17 15.2 0.030 0.109 83.4 9.1
94 0.25 16.1 0.054 0.191 75.1 14.4
95 0.25 22.2 0.072 0.258 70 18.0
96 0.23 27.2 0.079 0.282 69.7 19.7
97 0.12 31.2 0.041 0.145 62.2 9.0
98 0.25 33.7 0.111 0.397 61.3 24.3
Average 0.22 23.0 0.065 0.232 70.1 16.2
Notes:
Columns (1) is computed from Hong Kong trade data, and is denoted by 1 π in the text. Columns
(2) is computed from Chinese processing trade data, and is denoted by α 1 in the text. Column
(3) equals ] 1 ) / 1 /[( ˆ 1 1 − π α . Column (4) equals ) ˆ 1 ( 1 ρ − /0.28, where 0.28 is the absolute
coefficient of the Hong Kong indicator variable for processing trade in Table 6. Column (5) is
obtained from Table 1, and column (6) equals columns (4) times (5).36
Table 9: Welfare Gain from Hong Kong Re-exports


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 Food and Live Animals 0.11 0.028 0.069 19.8 1.4
1 Beverages and Tobacco 0.05 0.013 0.030 51.3 1.5
2 Crude Materials 0.27 0.084 0.310 51.8 16.1
3 Mineral Fuels 0.09 0.023 0.142 3.3 0.5
4 Animal and Vegetable
Oils
0.07 0.017 na 0.0 na
5 Chemical Products 0.05 0.011 0.022 30.5 0.7
6 Manufactured Goods
Classified by Material
0.18 0.051 0.221 44.4 9.8
7 Machinery and
Transport Equip.
0.19 0.053 0.277 75.4 20.9
8 Misc. Manufactured
Articles
0.24 0.072 na 73.6 na
All Industries 0.22 0.065 0.232 70.1 16.2
Notes:
Columns (1) is computed from Hong Kong trade data, and is denoted by 1 π in the text. Column
(2) equals ] 1 ) / 1 /[( 23 . 0 1 − π . Column (3) equals ) ˆ 1 ( 1 ρ − divided by the coefficient of the Hong
Kong indicator variable for processing trade in Table 7. Column (4) is obtained from Table 2,
and column (5) equals columns (3) times (4).37
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